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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZlO~~ Fl H~T XATTOXAL BANK, I 
t\. A., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
~~~~~CI~:H C. TAYLOR, BANK ( 
t'O:\IJII~~IOX.BJR OF THE STATE ) 
<H, UTAH and FIRST SECURITY 
STAT~~ BANK, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case 
No. 
9960 
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully moves the court, 
pursuant to Rule 7G(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedun', to reconsider its opinion in this case, grant 
a rehearing, and upon said reconsideration and rehearing 
to modify its prior decision, eliminating the direction 
by the l ~ourt to ren1and the branch bank application of 
appellant, First Security State Bank, to the Bank 
Commissioner for further proceedings. 
The decision should be reconsidered and a rehearing 
granted for the following reasons: 
I. There is a legally sufficient record before this 
Court upon which to base an absolute affirmance of the 
Trial Court's ruling without remand for further pro-
ceedings. 
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A. The deposition of Spencer C. Taylor, Bank 
Connnissioner, constitutes a proper part of the 
record in that it was stipulated into evidence 
as constituting the basis upon which his dis-
puted decision was rendered. 
B. The deposition of Spencer C. Taylor, Bank 
Connnissioner, constitutes a proper part of the 
record in that it established the factual basis 
upon which his disputed decision was rendered, 
as distinguished from inquiry into his mental 
processes. 
II. Under the affirmative facts in the record before 
this Court, there was "unreasonable interference" by 
reason of "such close proximity" in violation of the 
-branch bank statute applicable to unincorporated areas 
of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
J. Thomas Greene 
Paul B. 'Cannon 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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BlUE~, 0~, PLAIXTIFF-RESPOXDEKT IN 
Sl' PI'Oi:T OF pgrriTIOX FOR REHEARING 
PHI~~Ll~LLX..:U{.Y STATEl\lENT 
Thi~ wa~ an adiun brought by Zions First National 
I ~ank (•hallenging as unauthorized in law and without 
foundation in fact the order of Spencer C. Taylor, Bank 
Couuuissioner of the State of Utah, which granted First 
St•(·urity State Bank (hereinafter referred to as First 
~~·l·urity) a charter to establish a branch bank in the 
Cottonwood ~Lall in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Trial 
l'ourt found that the Bank Commissioner abused his 
administrative discretion in that he failed to take account 
of or ignored the branch banking statute applicable to 
unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County (7-3-6 U.C.A. 
l~l~);), as runended). Respondent sought affirmance of 
the Trial Court'~ ruling on the ground of abuse of 
ad.tnin1~trative discretion (both in ignoring the "close 
proximity" statute by failing to make factual determin-
ations contemplated thereby, and in rendering an alleged 
d!'termination that the new branch would "subserve the 
public convenience and advantage"), but also upon the 
broader ground that under affirmatively shown facts 
in the record, there was "unreasonable interference" as 
a matter of law occasioned by ··such close proximity" 
within the Ineaning of 7-3-6 U.C . .A., 1953, as amended. 
The decision of this Court, filed April 7, 1964, affirmed 
the lower Court's judgut~nt setting aside the order 
granting the branch bank charter, but ren1anded the 
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application to the Bank Commissioner for further pro-
ceedings. It appears that the principal reason for re-
mand was that a portion of the record, namely the 
deposition of the Bank Commissioner, was regarded as 
not reviewable or properly before the Court, although 
the said deposition ~was taken by plaintiff without objec-
tion, offered into evidence by the defendants, and stipu-
lated as a part of the record by all parties. The legal 
sufficiency of the said deposition as a reviewable part 
of the record has never been argued by counsel for 
either side. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS A LEGALLY SUFFI1CIENT RECORD BEFORE 
THIS COURT UPON WHICH TO BASE AN ABSOLUTE 
AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WITH-
OUT REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
The basis for the Court's order of remand essentially 
appears to be that a legally reviewable record was not 
before the Court, and that a public hearing should be 
held to create a proper record. In this connection, the 
Court stated that the deposition of Spencer C. Taylor, 
Bank Commissioner, "should never have been taken." 
Petitioner requests to be heard as to these matters. 
Counsel has had no opportunity at any stage of these 
proceedings to present authorities or to submit argument 
with reference to these points. Accordingly, this petition 
is filed primarily for the purpose of presenting authori-
ties and argument which would justify this Court in 
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n·viPwiru .. ~ thP untin· r<·<·ord before it, including the Bank 
Commissioul'r's dt'}Jo .... ·itiou, and rendering a decision 
without m·<·P~~arily rmnanding this cause for further 
pro<'l'udings. 
A. THE DEPOSITION OF SPENCER C. TAYLOR CON-
STITUTES A PROPER PART OF THE RECORD IN THA:T 
IT WAS STIPULATED INTO EVIDENCE AS ·CONSTITUT-
ING THE BASIS UPON WHICH HIS DI,SPUTED DECISION 
WAS RENDERED. 
The depo~ition of ~pencer U. Taylor, Bank Commis-
sioner, wm.; takPn lcitlwut objection by either counsel 
for the defendant Bank Commissioner or counsel for 
thP defendant First Security. At the trial, it was offered 
into P\·idPtH'<' by the defendants, and it was stipulated 
into evidence by all parties after deletion of certain 
portions which related to information obtained by the 
Conunissioner after the date of his decision and therefore 
couldn't have been considered by him as a basis for the 
disputed decision. 
It would appear that any claim of privilege which 
might otherwise haYe been asserted relative either to 
the initial deposition or its introduction into evidence 
was conclusively waived by reason of failure to object 
tlwr~to. 16 An1. Jur .. Depositions, § 138. In any event, 
the factual content of the deposition, pertaining to what 
wa~ before the Com1nissioner, became a matter of stip-
ulation. The stipulation agreed upon provided in part : 
..... it is stipulated by and between the parties 
herein that the deposition of Spencer C.Taylor, 
bank conunissioner of the State of Utah, taken 
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before Lois P. Crowder, notary public, on April 
22, 1963, offered by defendants, may he admitted 
in evidence as the testimony of said Spencer C. 
Taylor in support of the issuance of the certificate 
dated October 16, 1962, for the establishment of 
a branch bank by First Security State Bank in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, subject, however, to the 
following conditions: .... " 
(R. 107) (Emphasis added) 
The general law applicable to stipulations is that: 
". . . stipulations made by parties to a judicial 
proceeding, or by their attorneys, within the scope 
of their authority, are binding upon those who 
make them and those whom they lawfully repre-
sent, and also upon the trial and appellate courts, 
in the absence of any valid ground or reason for 
refusing enforcement." (Emphasis added.) 
50 Am. Jur., Stipulations,§ 9 
The authors of American J urispudence have noted 
that stipulations may supplement otherwise deficient 
records for purposes of judicial review in administrative 
proceedings : 
"While it is better practice for an appealing party 
to file in court a verbatim record of testimony 
taken before the agency, where the statute pro-
viding for the appeal does not require such record 
it was held there was no error in permitting the 
filing of a transcript certified to by the commis-
sion as constitttting the substance of the testimony 
heard by it 'to the best of our recollection.' ... by 
the grace of court, and in the absence of objection, 
an appeal my be heard on an irregular record." 
(Emphasis added.) 
2 Am. J ur., Administrative Law, § 722 at p. 623 
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'rhis Court has recognized the principle that stipu-
lntions ol' l'ad an· not only binding upon the parties, but 
upon tlw eourts. 'fhus, in RickcJ/lJcrg v. Capitol Garage, 
liS Ftah :m, ~-t~) l'a<'. 1:21 (1926), a ~tipulation was upheld 
t'Vt'll though t•vidPJWP was presented which the court 
nott•d supportt·d a eontrary contention. The court said: 
.. \Y" rPmark, a cmnplete answer to the foregoing 
<·onh•ntion is that it was stipulated at the hearing 
in tlw eourt below, and the stipulation appears 
in t hP record, that the respondent was convicted 
of tlw offense of driving an automobile while 
intoxi('atP<l. Respondent is bound by that stip-
ulat ioJ/. w1d so are we." (Emphasis added.) 
~-+9 P. 2d at 122 
~~l'l' also l'ulkcr-Sculccruft Lurnber Co. v. Vance, 36 
l~tah 3-!S, 103 Pac. 970 (1909').) 
In Denver (0 R.G.H'.R. Co. v. Central Weber Sewer 
I. Di~t.,-! Utah 2d 105,287 P.2d 884 (1955), this Court 
judicially n•viewed an administrative decision wherein 
the record was otherwise deficient, since the record 
was bolstered by additional stipulated facts. In that 
casp Justice Henriod said: 
"Ordinarily on writ of review the certified record 
alone is exruninable. Not so, however, where the 
record and determination of the cornrnission or 
board are unsupported by sorne kind of reason-
ably substantial proof. In that event the judiciary 
may awaken to question their warrant, and in 
doing so, may receive, examine and weigh evi-
dence, if neces~ary, as it did here on stipulated 
facts, to the end that due process guarantees will 
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maintain." (Emphasis added.) 
287 P.2d at 886, 887 
In this case the parties desired to stipulate and did 
stipulate in effect that what the Bank Commissioner, 
Spencer C. Taylor, testified to in his deposition was in 
fact the evidence which was before him and constituted 
the evidence upon which he based his administrative 
decision. By virtue of this stipulation of fact the record 
became established and properly reviewable quite inde-
pendent of the question whether or not the deposition 
should have been taken in the first place. Since the Bank 
Commissioner has stipulated as to the facts upon which 
he based his Certificate for a branch bank issued October 
16, 1962, and the question before this Court is whether 
or not that Certificate was valid when issued, a hearing 
before the Bank Commissioner now conducted for the 
purpose of determining the validity of the Certificate 
already issued cannot properly develop any facts other 
than or in addition to those already stipulated to by the 
Bank Commissioner. The record is properly reviewable 
as to matters previously argued before this Court, then, 
since it constitutes a stipulated record. 
B. THE DEPOSITION OF SPENCER C. TAYLOR, BANK 
COMMISSIONER, CONSTITUTES A PROPER PART OF THE 
RECORD IN THAT' IT ESTABLISHED THE FACTUAL 
BA:SIS UPON WHICH HIS DISPUTED DECISION WAS 
RENDERED, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM INQUIRY INTO 
'HIS M,ENTAL PROCESSES. 
The Court's decision apparently regards the depo-
sition which was taken of the Bank Commissioner as an 
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unwunruitctl at tt•tupt to probe the 1nental processes of an 
admi11i:-;lratin· offirPr in his quasi-judicial capacity. In 
thi~ n·guru, tlw l'ourt said that the deposition " ... in 
el'l't•d, attL•HtptL·d to elicit his reasons." The authority 
l'ill'd ru1d tluoted by the Court as applicable and control-
ling is the fourth of the so-called protracted ".Morgan 
ca~l':-;, ... 11 orgu II v. l .II it eel States, 313 u.s. 409 (1941) . 
. \:-; aln•ady noted, there has been no opportunity here-
tofore for COl/lise! to ()OIIuneut or submit argument with 
n·spcct to the relevance of the said ill organ case, which 
authority wa~ set forth for the first time in these pro-
ceedings in this Court's opinion. It is submitted that 
both the fact::; and the principle set forth in the Morgan 
case are fundamentally distinguishable from the case 
at bar! 
In Morgan there was a mandatory statutory require-
Hit' Ill for a "full hcarillg" before the Secretary of Agri-
cuUurc. ~uch a hearing "·as held and a voluminous record 
ll'as made. Tlw deposition of the Secretary was author-
ized over the Got·ernment's objection, and it was appar-
ent that thl• purpose of the deposition was not to elicit 
factual data otherwise unavailable, but fundamentally 
the purpose was to probe the relative weight given by the 
administrator to rarious portions of the existing record. 
l-ndt.•r this stah, of facts the U.S. Supre1ne Court regard-
ed the exrunination essentially as an inquiry or probe 
into the Secretary's mental processes. 
On tlw other hand. in the ca~e at bar, Justice Callis-
ter correctly observed that there was 110 statutory right 
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to a hearing before the State Bank Commi00iouer, and 
commented that "the legislature saw fit in 1957 to elim-
inate the mandatory requirement that public hearings 
be held." Since the old statute, U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, had 
been repealed and there was no law on the books relative 
to public hearings at pertinent times herein, the Bank 
Commissioner held no hearing and no record was made. 
Accordingly, the deposition of the Bank Commissioner 
was taken without objection as the only practicable means 
of determining the facts, if any, which were before him 
as the b,asis for the decision which had already been 
rendered. The deposition wasn't meant to "elicit reasons" 
or "probe mental processes." Rather, it was designed 
to and did simply determine the facts which were before 
the Commissioner. 
A fundamental distinction exists between taking 
depositions of administrative officers to "probe mental 
processes" as compared with necessary inquiry into the 
factual basis for the decision in question. The :Morgan 
cases are consistent with such a distinction. Actually, 
while the fourth Morgan case referred to in the Court's 
decision herein has been regarded as 1nodifying somewhat 
the previous Morgan cases as to the propriety of taking 
depositions of administrative officers, the ~Iorgan cases 
are not necessarily inconsistent with themselves and the 
Court did not expressly retreat or recede from its former 
statements. In the first ~forgan case the Court required 
defendants (including the Secretary of Agriculture) to 
answer allegations that a rate order was 1nade "without 
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having heard or n·ad any of tlH· evidence, and without 
hnving heard tht· oral argmnenb or having read or 
eonsi<lt>rPd the briPf~ whieh the plaintiff sub1nitted." 
.l/or!Jlllt r. United 8/u/('s, :.ms U.~. -!-(iS, -1-78 (1936). 
~imilarly. whilP in thP second ~l_organ case tlu· Secre-
tary':-; order wa:-; upsPt because of procedural defects, 
thP Court n·t·ognized tlH· necessity of administrative 
offit·t·r~· dPei:-;ions bt·ing l>a:-;Pd upon considerations of 
evidPIH't'. The Court said: 
"ln thP light of this testi1nony th('re is nu occasion 
to discuss the e.rteut to which tlze Secretary exam-
ined the cl;idellc<', and we agree with the Govern-
lllt'llt ':-; contention that it was not the function 
of the eourt to probe the mental process of the 
~l'l'rt>tary in reaehing his conclusions if he gave 
the hearing which the law required." (E1nphasis 
added.) 
1llorgan r. r:nitcd States} 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938~ 
ln any l'VPnt, the authors of Alnerican Jurisprudence 
han• nott•d a line of cases distinguishable from the 
~lorgan ea~P under which circu1nstances similar to the 
l:<l~l' at bar justify the taking of depositions of admin-
i~trative officials: 
··The decision in the first Morgan Case that 
the officer who decides in administrative pro-
ceedings n1ust consider the evidence taken before 
another official raised the problen1 whether on 
review the party seeking relief from an adminis-
trative order might examine the officer or subject 
him to interrogatories regarding the process by 
which he reached his conclusions. However, the 
rater :Morgan Cases settled that just as a judge 
cannot be subjected to such scrutiny, so the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization pr vided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
integrity of the adrninistrative process must be 
equally respected. Earlier cases stated the same 
principle. It has been held in some state courts 
that where an order is only prima facie correct 
and is required to be made upon evidence and 
no record of the evidence is required to be kept, the 
officers making the order may be called as 
witnesses and required to testify whether in fact 
any evidence was submitted to and considered by 
them as the basis for such order." (Emphasis 
added.) 
42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 2-!2. 
An A.L.R. annotation also discusses the most recent 
Morgan decision together with cases which take the 
contrary position. 18 A.L.R. 2d 606 (1951). 
In State v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 72 Fla. 
379, 73 So. 171 (1916), the court was confronted by the 
contention that Railroad Commissioners had made an 
order relating to carriage of freight without any evidence 
before them upon which to base such an order. The court 
ruled that the commissioners could be called as witnesses 
and required to testify whether, in fact, any evidence 
was submitted to and considered by them. The court said: 
"We have considered the testimony of the 
railroad comn1issioners, :Mr. Burr, :.Mr. Blitch, 
and Mr. Dunn, in this case, and overrule the 
point made by their attorney that it is contrary 
to public policy 'that a railroad commissioner 
should be called as a witness to impeach their 
own orders.' This court has said that, although 
the law gives to administrative action the effect 
of prima facie reasonableness, the courts may 
inquire into the reasonableness of the action .. ·" 
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'fhe partiP~ have had their day in court, have 
ht>Pn ]ward upon the law and evidence before 
tht> tribunal possessing the power and authority 
to dett•rnline the questions, but the very authority 
of the railroad conwti.ssioners in making such an 
order ({:) the one involved in this case depends 
llJJOII th<' fact that evi.dence was before them upon 
ll'hich to base the order·. To say that a carrier 
UfJU i 11st u:lwm such an order is made cannot call 
a railroad commi00ianer· as a witness to show that 
h(' had no crideuce before him on which to base 
the order, or the character of evidence which was 
before hi111, zcmtld be in effect to hold the order 
itself cauclusive of its reasonableness and accom-
plish i 11d irectly, by a technical rule of evidence 
made for the occasion, that which admittedly 
cwwot be directly accomplished by legislative 
cuactmeut. It would render meaningless the lang-
uage of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission-
ers,~33 U.S. 601, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 59 L. Ed. 379; 
Intt•rstate Connnerce Commission v. Union Pac. 
Hy. Co., 222 U.S. 5-±1, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 
308. llou; cottld it be shown that no ev~dence 
H'a.s before the cmnmis0ioners, and none consid-
ered by them in makillg the order, unless by the 
rcry person before whom it was pretended to be 
submitted? The law does not require them to 
preserve th et·ideuce in writing and file it, nor 
recite it in their orders~ therefore the absence 
of any such record fron1 the files of their office 
raises no presrunption that no evidence was 
heard.'' (Emphasis added.) 
73 So. at 176 
In State ex rel. Jladison .Airport Co. v. Wrabetz, 
et al. 231 \\~ise. 1-17, 283 X.\Y. 504: (1939), a writ of man-
damus was sought relative to commanding the State 
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Industrial Commission to correct an award so as to 
conform to true facts. The court ruled that petitioner 
would be entitled to introduce proof that members 
of the Industrial Commission did not in fact base their 
review on necessary evidence and said : 
"Although it is not within the court's functions 
or province to probe the mental processes of ad-
ministrative officials in reaching conclusions, 
the recitals of their orders as to their procedure 
in conducting quasi-judicial proceedings are not 
co~lusive in actions to !determine whether a 
plaintiff is entitled to have an order vacated on 
the ground that the officials acted without or in 
excess of their powers, and in such actions the 
plaintiff is entitled to have the court receive 
his proof and render a decision on that issue." 
285 N.W. at 508. (Emphasis added.) 
In National Labor Relations Bd. v. Cherry Cotton 
Mills, 98 F.2d -l±-1, (CA 5, 1938), reh. den. 98 F.2d 1021, 
it was held that interrogatories for discovery might be 
addressed to members of the National Labor Relations 
Board where it was claimed that there had not been a 
fair hearing and that there was failure to give proper 
consideration to evidence submitted. Such was permitted 
in order to preserve judicial review of pretended 
findings. 
In a very recent case arising in the district of rtah, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the right 
of inquiry into the facts before the Securities & Exchange 
Commission with reference to the issue of abuse of 
administrative discretion. In that case, the appellate 
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t•uurt sd a~idc a judgment enforcing an adutinistrative 
::;ubpoPna in view of an uncontron·rtt·d affidavit that 
tlH· Conuni~~ion was proceeding in an arbitrary and 
unfnir munm·r. Shasta J/ i ue ral . .,· & Chemical Campa ny 
r. St'Cit rit in; cl'· E.rchWI!JC Conunission, 328 F.2d 285 
(l'.\ 10 1964). 
In vonl'lusion as to the right of factual inquiry, this 
~·ourt hy its prt>~l'nt opinion, consistent with Inany prior 
pn•et•dPnts, rt:>eognizes a clear right to judicial review 
of I ht' act ion of ad m iu i.strative ageucies on the question 
of alnt.-..·c of ad m i 11 istrative discretiou. In this connection, 
Ju~tiet> Calli~tPr notPd that the Bank Commissioner's 
dPei~ion could stand only ''if it is supported by any 
substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious." 
Thus, wt> are confronted with the problein of having 
hPfore us a decision which was clearly reviewable if, but 
ouly if. therC' wn~ 011 appropriate factual foundation upon 
u:hich to lwsc such judicial rcz·iczc. It is submitted that 
under tlw circumstances of this case it ·was appropriate 
t(\ take the Bank Commissioner's deposition in order to 
t ~~~tblish facts sufficient for consideration upon review. 
POINT II 
l"XDER THE AFFIR:\IATIVE FACTS IN THE RECORD 
BEFORE THIS COl'RT, THERE WAS "UNREASONABLE 
IXTERFERENCE" BY REASON OF "SUCH CLOSE PROX-
DIITY" IN VIOLATION OF THE BRANCH BANK STATUTE 
APPLICABLE TO UNINCORPORATED AREAS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. 
This point is urged a~ an independent ground in 
support of this Petition for Rehearing. \Yjth regard 
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to this matter, it is not urged that the Court uwdify or 
change its decision in any particular, but only that it 
be expanded so as to elucidate principles recognized by 
the Court in its opinion in view of facts before the Court 
in the record. It is acknowledged that the Court has 
ruled in effect that the matter of whether or not "close 
proximity" constitutes "unreasonable interference" is 
a question of fact and not of law. Thus, this Court stated 
that " 'close proximity' does not in and of itself prohibit 
the establishment of a branch. The 'close proximity' 
must 'unreasonably interfere' with the established bank 
or branch." However, it affirmatively appears from 
facts within the record before this Court that there was 
u such close proximity" as to constitute "unreasonable 
interference." 
The record affirmatively discloses by admission in 
the pleadings that Zions "is losing money as a result 
of the operation of its branch in the Cottonwood Mall 
and that the addition of another branch in the area would 
have an adverse financial effect upon the business of 
the Cottonwood Branch of the plaintiff." (R. 5, 10) In 
this connection, evidence was presented to Commissioner 
'Taylor that at least three years after the time the 
shopping center opened (which would be sometime in 
1965 or 1966) would be required to enable the Zions 
branch to "become self-sustaining" (R. 26) and to get 
"on its feet" (Dep. 34), in view of the nature and 
location of the branch. The factual survey hy the Bank 
Commissioner's office disclosed an unusual degree of 
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hank per (~api ta ::;aturation in the area resulting in an 
"on·r bankt~d condition,'' and "no need" for additional 
banking facilities in the area in <.J.Uestion (R. 87). In 
addition, it appears frmn the deposition of Commissioner 
Taylor that the Zions Branch being located within the 
~I all had foregone the advantages of the free-standing 
drive-in tn)(' bank business (Dep. 33), and that its suc-
e.P~~ depended upon attraction of the business accounts 
primarily within the Mall itself (R. 26). However, 
tlvidl'tH'(' before the Cmnmissioner also disclosed that 
First ~t·eurity emphasized as a condition to success 
at its contemplated location within the Mall the taking 
over of the very accounts necessary to sustain the new 
Zions Branch, namely, acquisition of "business accounts 
primarily from the shopping center itself .... " (R. 20) 
(Emphasis added.) 
X one of the foregoing facts are disputed anywhere 
in the record, and based upon such this Court could and 
should interpret the unique branch banking statute 
which is applicable only to unincorporated areas of 
~a.lt Lake County so as to give substance to it and to 
declare whether or not in the light of these facts there 
was a violation of the statute. It is submitted that these 
facts affirmatively show "such close proximity" as to 
constitute "unreasonable interference." 
CONCLUSION 
Tlw fundrunental basis for this petition i8 that the 
parties ought to be giren a11 opport'unity to present 
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argument with respect to the action which has beeJ 
taken in remanding the case to the Bank Commissione: 
for further proceedings. Rmnand to the Bank Commis 
sioner for further proceedings was not requested b~ 
either party, was not argued, and counsel for 11eithe1 
side has been heard as to this matter. Rehearing i~ 
particularly requested so that the views of counsel may 
be presented and considered by the Court. 
It is submitted that a proper record already exists 
before the Court and that the deposition of the Bank 
Commissioner constitutes a valid portion of such record 
both by virtue of the stipulation of the parties and by 
reason of the nature and purpose of the deposition 
itself as a necessary determination of facts. In any 
event, since the determinative question before the Trial 
Court and this Court is the validity of the Certificate 
for a branch bank issued October 16, 1962, and the 
defendants have stipulated as to all of the facts con-
stituting the basis for the Certificate, a rehearing before 
the Commissioner on the present application cannot 
legitimately establish any other or different record than 
~s now before this Court. 
It is also submitted that the record presents suf-
ficient undisputed facts as to show affirmatively a 
violation of the branch bank statute applicable to unin-
corporated areas of Salt Lake County, i.e., "unreasonable 
interference" occasioned by "such close proximity." 
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l•'or thP reason~ a:-;:-;(•rt(•d, plaintiff-respondent re-
•l'l•·:·d:-; that a rehearing be held in this rnatter. 
RP~IH·etfully submitted, 
~IAHH, \\"ILKIK~ & CANNON 
J. Thmnas Greene 
Paul B. Cannon 
£Utorii<',IJS fur Respondent 
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